![](https://steemitimages.com/DQmasjUDKYjxeAD9S34KsskLghMheSizczDj1qHc2t1RVAp/image.png) @LarkenRose recently published a piece called the Social Contract Excuse that failed to achieve its objective of debunking social contract theory for reasons that applied equally to his own argument, as I will show below. To be clear, I'm certainly no proponent of social contract theory or the constitution, as I have written here, here, and here. His conclusions about social contract theory are correct, but the arguments that got him there are not. In the deconstructive analysis that follows, you will see that the objective of Larken's opinion piece was not to argue against social contract theory, as he states. To the contrary, he was merely borrowing credibility from Lysander Sooner's arguments against it. Larken's actual objective was to trick readers into accepting a premise which can be used to justify a form of unrestricted immigration that further augments the damage done to victims of the state. Note: Larken commonly accuses people of lying or misquoting him when he can't refute their arguments, thus I've taken the liberty of citing his entire article and responding to it in context. Let's begin. > "There are zero rational justifications for the existence of a ruling class (“government”)." I get that he's using the terms "ruling class" and "government" interchangeably, and I don't necessarily disagree with his conclusions regarding the state, but it should probably be pointed out that "ruling class" could also mean a "naturalis oblige" comprised of people who have earned the respect of their communities with regard to their fields of expertise and are thus sought out as natural authorities on certain matters. Such a group of people wouldn't necessarily constitute a government. "Ruling class" could even mean groups of private property owners , and this likewise wouldn't constitute a government if these property owners didn't have a territorial monopoly on ultimate decision making or taxation. > "So what the believers in the Divine Right of Politicians have, instead of logical arguments, is contorted retroactive excuses for why they still believe things that are patently ridiculous. " Ironically, this isn't a logical argument. > "And one common lame attempt to legitimize the presence of coercive parasitical ruling classes is the “social contract” theory, which basically states that by merely existing in a particular geographical area, you are “agreeing” to abide by the rules of whatever ruling class claims it as their domain." This is both an oversimplification and a misconception. I may not be a proponent of social contract theory either, but I know enough to know that they aren't making this claim. If we want to deconstruct social contract theory, we need to at least be honest and accurate. It isn't necessarily that proponents of social contract theory think that you're obligated to follow the rules of "the ruling class"; in fact, they often don't differentiate between the ruling class and the ruled because of their perception that anyone can enter freely into politics, which certainly is the case to some degree in countries with democratic governments. Further, they aren't arguing that claims alone demonstrate territorial jurisdiction. In most cases, they believe that territorial jurisdiction is established by the shared history their communities have in certain geographic regions. Their argument isn't that claims alone establish ownership or authority; it's that they've invested in their communities and in the protection of even ostensibly unused land, which they perceive as an economic good -- even in its ostensibly unused state. They might not be right about social contract theory, but they aren't wrong about having a better claim to these resources than individuals or groups of individuals who've never invested anything in the community. > "Demolishing that bit of statist mythology is quite easy. Observe: “I hereby declare all of North America to be mine. By being here, you are agreeing to be ruled by me. So either give me half your money, right now, or get out!”" To wit, there are no governments or individual members of government claiming to have territorial jurisidction over all of North America. Attacking a fictitious government doesn't exactly prove his point. Also, again, no one is claiming that claims alone establish territorial jurisdiction. > "Who would accept such a claim and such a demand as legitimate and righteous? I’m guessing no one … if I’m the one who made the claim. " No one would just accept that from government either, but again, no one is even proposing the standard of "claims alone establish authority" (except judges and prosecutors). That's why you don't see individual state governments claiming all of North America, and it's why you don't see Japan claiming all of China. The territorial limits of a government's jurisdiction represent that government's ability to defend those limits against invasion, which necessarily involves an investment of stolen capital from the domestic population. This investment doesn't establish a perfect property claim to the territory involved, but it does establish a claim that is superior to that of any other uninvested, uninvited latecomer. > "Everyone would recognize it as silly and invalid." Correct. And I assume that he proposed this strawman for exactly that reason. He wanted to appear as though he refuted their argument without having to invest any effort or put forth a "logical argument", as he puts it. > "However, if an equally absurd assertion was made by a bunch of long-since-dead wig-wearing political opportunists, suddenly most of the country views it as not only legitimate, but as sacred and profound. So the “Founding Fathers” sat down, said some stuff, wrote some stuff, did some rituals, and then magically had the right to corrosively govern and control a million or so acres of land, the vast majority of which they had never even seen? Wow, that’s some powerful magic. (Or some utter bullshit.)" The people who wrote the constitution didn't have the right to grant themselves a territorial monopoly on ultimate decision making or the power of taxation. However, people don't identify with the constitution because of the framers, the wigs, or rituals per se. They identify with it because of the sense of shared history and sacrifice that came with the wars which were fought over the use of the land. They identify with it because, as I already mentioned, democracy blurs the lines between rulers and the ruled. We all know that they've never signed it but they see themselves as party to it if and insofar as they see it as beneficial to them to do so. I certainly don't believe in the validity of the constitution but Larken's argument is totally non-responsive to those who do. > "Viewing the U.S. Constitution as being at all like a “contract” makes exactly no sense. To state the obvious, a contract is a formal agreement between (at least) two parties. By definition, one cannot be contractually bound by a “contract” that he never agreed to, and in fact had nothing at all to do with. For example, I can’t just decide to sign a contract on your behalf, and pretend that that makes you obligated to do something. (For the most thorough annihilation of the notion that the Constitution was some sort of contract, read “No Treason: The Constitution of No Authority,” by Lysander Spooner.)" This is one hundred percent correct. I agree with Larken on this point. However, one can still incur negative obligations like non-aggression without agreeing to a contract, which is the ostensible premise of Larken's attempt at rebutting social contract theory. > "The idea that a bunch of people could make you be bound by a “contract” that you had absolutely nothing to do with is ludicrous." Correct, but that doesn't mean that you couldn't incur a negative obligation not to trespass without agreeing to a contract. > "And equally silly is the notion that one party can decide what “counts” as the other party “agreeing.” “If you set foot anywhere between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, that counts as you agreeing to this!” No, it doesn’t." This is where things get a bit murky. First of all, "silly" is just an appeal to his own subjective preferences. If his argument were valid and universally true, it would be silly for property owners to set rules for guests in their own homes or to evict trespassers; it would be silly for women to have standards for consenting to sex. These types of normative standards aren't silly. They exist to avoid physical conflict between present users and latecomers over the use of scarce resources. Of course, Larken could claim that there are places not currently in use, but such a claim would undercut the subjective theory of value as it's not uncommon for groups of people to use unimproved land as a barrier between themselves and trespassers -- which is exactly what's happening with the ostensibly unused land in America. Further, "trees growing mean it's unowned" isn't a valid property norm, nor is constant occupancy a prerequisite for the establishment of a property right. Further still, the entire purpose of property norms is to avoid and resolve conflicts over the use of scarce, physical resources. Arguing over the use of a scarce resource like land in an attempt to say it's unused is therefore a performative contradiction. Proponents of social contract theory might be wrong about social contract theory, but that doesn't render their proposed property norms "silly" -- especially given that private property norms likewise rank present use as establishing a better right to property than the one possessed by uninvited latecomers. The only thing that's silly about their theory is that they think they have the right to maintain a territorial monopoly on ultimate decision making and taxation, even with regard to conflicts involving themselves. > "(There also seem to be a number of people who get obsessed with “patriot mythology,” and cling to all manner of theories about how you “accidentally agreed” to be ruled, by getting a Social Security Number, or a driver’s license, or using Federal Reserve Notes, or calling yourself a “citizen,” etc. But no, you can’t “accidentally” become contractually bound by something that someone else arbitrarily declares “counts” as agreeing to something. If you doubt it, then I hereby declare that by wearing socks last week, you accidentally agreed to give me half your money. So hand it over!)" I don't disagree that this is stupid. There is no capacity to consent to something when violence is the punishment for not consenting -- even by accident. However, that STILL doesn't mean that you can't incur a negative obligation to not trespass on property to which you have no right, and it still doesn't prove that land is automatically unowned just because you don't agree with what it's being used for -- especially if you have to engage in a dispute over its use to make the claim that it is. Further, with regard to "patriot mythology", it might be stupid to have a territorial monopoly on taxation and ultimate decision making (i.e. a state) but it's not stupid to share a sense of identity and purpose with your family and the communities in which your family exists -- especially since the importance of these natural bonds would be emphasized absent the state. Social trust and cohesion is what makes the division of labor and rising standards of living possible. The diminishment of the state would strengthen those bonds; not weaken them, as Larken implies. > "The arguments put forth by statists (and in particular constitutionalists) imply that somehow a small group of politicians, by mere decree, acquired legitimate ownership of half a continent, and so may now tell anyone in that geographical area what to do. Again, that is no more reasonable or valid than it would be for me to just unilaterally declare that I personally own North America, and that everyone here has to either obey me or leave. And if I decided to preface my lunatic decree with, “On behalf of the people, I hereby decide that North America belongs to me,” that wouldn’t make it any more valid. Or sane." Again, they aren't arguing that "mere decree" establishes territorial jurisdiction. They are also informed by both their own inability to differentiate between the ruling class and the ruled, and their ties to the communities in which they live. I don't disagree that the establishment of a state wasn't legitimate but it would be woefully inaccurate to emphasize the "decrees" of politicians to the exclusion of democratic group identity, which is the real issue with social contract theory. > "But now we get to the point where the constitutionalists really shoot themselves in the foot, without even noticing. The entire “social contract” mythology relies on the assumption that somehow, through various documents and rituals, the U.S. Congress made half of North America their rightful territorial jurisdiction—essentially their property—such that now they have the right to issue and enforce rules upon those who choose to reside in their domain." I've already sufficiently covered why this isn't exactly true. > "And if you don’t like it, you can get out! In fact, constitutionalists often come right out and compare the national jurisdiction to private property: “If you’re on my property, you have to follow my rules, or leave! The country is like our collective property, and our representatives decide the rules! So obey their laws or get out!”"" He's right, they do do this. The reason they do it is because conflicts still occur over the use of land which constitutes said "national jurisdiction". As demonstrated by the fact that Larken himself has a contention over the use of these physical resources, it is still necessary to apply property norms to them as best we can despite the fact that the government isn't legitimate. Otherwise, conflict over their use will be maximized, as is always the case when latecomers are assumed to have equal or better claims than present users. > "But that is where their position completely implodes. > Allow me to explain. If I am in your living room, ultimate I have one right: the right to leave. That’s all. Whatever else you allow me to do is completely up to you. (To own something means to have the exclusive right to decide what is done with something, and if you own your house, that means you have the right to decide who can be there.)" Point of clarification: "Exclusive right" means the right to exclude; it does not mean that you do not share the right to exclude with other owners, nor does it mean you can unilaterally include latecomers when you do share the right to exclude with other owners. In the case of house ownership, for example, it isn't uncommon for husbands and wives to share joint ownership. We wouldn't say that houses with two owners are unowned; we would merely say that two people have the right to exclude all other latecomers. As such, both owners are free to exclude anyone they want, but neither can diminish the utility of the house by inviting latecomers without the consent of the other owner. He continues: > "For example, while I think it would be silly and rude, you have every right to tell others that they may only enter your house if they wear huge purple top hats, and eat lots of moldy asparagus. The only real power you have is the power to make them leave, but because you have that right—the right to decide who can be there—that means you can make up any bizarre, daffy “rules” you want, and then others can decide if they want to be on your property enough that they will choose to follow your rules." Valid point. > "(The only thing you can’t do is forcibly prevent them from leaving.)" Unless we're talking about a child, in which case the parent certainly can prevent the child from leaving in order to protect the child, as is their obligation. > "So, for example, I have no unalienable right to carry a gun in your house, if you don’t want me to. I have no unalienable right to speak my mind in your house, if you don’t want me to. I have no unalienable right to do anything in your house, because I have no unalienable right to be there at all. Whether I am allowed in, and what I am allowed to do while there, is utterly and completely your choice. (Again, this is only because you can always tell me to leave if you don’t like what I’m doing, or not doing.) That is how private property works." Agreed. 100%. > "So what happens when we apply this to political jurisdictions?" What happens if we don't? What happens if no one can exclude anyone else? I'll tell you: Conflict over the use of the resource in question is maximized because present users have no right to stop or exclude latecomers. > "If, for example, Congress has rightful “authority” over this huge piece of dirt known as “The United States”—if it is their turf, and everyone here must either obey their “laws” or leave—then the notion of citizens having “unalienable rights” is out the window." Unalienable rights, sure. But that's because rights aren't inherent in the first place; they're normative -- which is to say that they are established by people for a purpose. In fact, Larken's entire moral condemnation of Congress (which I think is valid) is based on the fact that it violates normative private property rights and the non-aggression principle to which they give rise. > "Who the hell are you to tell someone else what requirements he can put upon you on his property? If living on this piece of dirt constitutes “agreeing” to abide by the “law of the land”—as the bogus “social contract” theory dictates—then you have exactly no rights, except the right to leave." It's true that you don't have any unalienable rights, but it's not true that you don't have any normative rights, or else Larken's moral condemnation of property violations would fall flat. That the government violates your rights doesn't mean that you don't expect non-aggression against you or your property; it just means that you have no means with which to stop it. As such, you might have the right to leave, but you might not have the ability to do so if you can't afford expatriation or passport fees. You also still have the right to not be aggressed against, even if you have no ability to enforce the negative obligation of non-aggression. > "(As it happens, to make things a degree more ridiculous, the U.S. parasites don’t even just allow people to leave in peace. They can deny passports, demand back taxes you supposedly owe, or continue to rob (“tax”) you even after you leave.)" True. > "And by the way, if the magical, mystical (non-existent) “social contract” makes you beholden to the U.S. “law-makers,” then “your” house isn’t yours. It’s theirs." Except that ownership isn't determined by who has the ability to trespass against you and get away with it. Property norms are established to avoid and address physical conflicts over the use of scarce resources. If the ability to get away with theft and trespass were a valid property norm, the entire concept of property and ownership would be meaningless because you can't avoid physical conflicts by provoking them. > "If they get to decide what you’re allowed to do in your “own” house, then by definition, it’s not your house." Again, that's not true. By definition, it means they are trespassers with more firepower than you. Might does not make right. I thought Larken understood that. Social contract theory isn't valid, but this isn't a valid argument against it. > "This is one more way in which proponents of the “social contract” theory manage to inadvertently but thoroughly disenfranchise themselves. Whatever intrusive or repressive crap your political masters want to impose upon you, you can either meekly obey, or you can get the hell out! That, according to you, is what you “agreed” to just by being here." Is this intended to convince people who don't already agree with him or is it just moral posturing and virtue signaling? As I already explained, proponents of social contract theory don't differentiate between rulers and the ruled because they take democracy at face value. Ranting about "political masters" and morally condemning your audience isn't going to convince them that they're bad people or that they aren't their own political masters -- which is exactly why they say you can't complain if you don't vote or get involved in politics, as Larken knows. Further, moral condemnation isn't an argument. > "And if we are going to accept the “social contract” garbage, why would it only apply on this particular piece of dirt? I guess everyone in North Korea, by merely existing there, is “agreeing” to be oppressed, controlled, monitored, robbed, assaulted, etc. Right? Isn’t that how the “social contract” works? And yes, the constitution of the DPRK uses the same sort of bogus euphemisms and propaganda about “representing the people” that American politicians do." Most of Larken's conclusions about social contract theory aren't wrong but the line of reasoning that got him there is deeply flawed, as evidenced by the arguments he makes against immigration restrictions elsewhere. It might be true that the North Koreans aren't bound by a legitimate social contract but it doesn't follow that they don't have the best claim to the land controlled by the North Korean government. Indeed, if America were to invade North Korea, resettle, and gentrify it, I'm sure Larken would be among the first to object. > "If you actually believe in “social contract” theory, then stop complaining about what any “government” does to those who have chosen to stay within its jurisdiction, thereby agreeing (according to you) to be subjected to whatever arbitrary and oppressive crap the parasite class there wants to inflict upon them. After all, according to the excuses constantly parroted by constitution-worshipers, by happening to be born on that piece of dirt, those people consented to that arrangement." This strikes me as victim blaming, but it's also not even a good or compelling argument -- especially if you're trying to sway someone who believes in social contract theory. They'll just see it as not dissimilar to saying a wife has no right to complain when punched by her husband because they chose to buy a house together. If Larken actually believes that there is no capacity to consent to government but that proponents of social contract theory genuinely believe their own arguments, I don't know why he wouldn't give them the benefit of the doubt given that they could be using the theory as a coping mechanism for both prior gaslighting and their own perceived powerlessness. To be sure, some people certainly do vote and advocate for social contract theory with malicious intent but for those who don't, he's just being cruel. They know not what they do. > "Of course, they didn’t really. Of course, it’s not okay for them to be oppressed. Of course, robbing and terrorizing people, and saying they “agreed” to it by setting foot on a huge piece of a dirt that you just unilaterally declared to be your rightful domain, is bat-shit crazy. > And it’s just as bat-shit crazy when Americans do it." It certainly is, but Larken is now making the same mistake proponents of social contract theory make by assuming that the rulers and the ruled are the same group of people. Because they were oppressed, and because they were robbed (as were their parents, and their parents, and their parents -- meaning their entire ESTATE was robbed, as were the communities in which they exist), it means that the net taxpayers of America whose families have been here for generations have the best claim to the use of state controlled resources like land in the event of a dispute over its use between themselves and people who have never lived here or been robbed. Just like the North Koreans would have the best claim to North Korea absent the state, the Americans have the best claim to America absent the state. Is their right to these resources a PERFECT property claim according to Lockean homesteading principles? No, but Lockean homesteading principles aren't sufficient for use as property norms (as I've written here), and it supersedes the property claims of all latecomers in accordance with normal private property norms. Again, if private property norms aren't applied to "public property" when a dispute occurs over its use, there will be perpetual conflict as never ending waves of latecomers impose themselves on present users. Larken tacitly acknowledges this as true by attempting to morally condemn social contract theory and government ownership of land, thus his entire argument is undercut by the preference he demonstrated by putting it forth. But if he can get you to accept these premises and that victims of taxation have no claim to the countries from which they hail, he can get you to accept his preference for imposing unlimited waves of migrants on America. Ironically, his criticisms of central planning apparently don't apply to his desire to centrally plan immigration. It may be true that social contract theory is invalid, but it doesn't necessarily follow that no one would have the authority to make rules for the use of "public property" absent the government, and it certainly doesn't follow that the existence of a government monopoly justifies a total free for all on these resources as such a standard would only serve to further augment the oppression and damage already done to the domestic population.